Legislative policy-making typically involves speeches and demands by the legislators that shape the proposals made by the leadership. For example, in the current health care legislation, the Senate bill includes $100 million in Medicaid funding for Nebraska as well as restrictions on abortion coverage in exchange for the vote of Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson. As another example, consider the recent threat by seven members of the Senate Budget Committee to withhold their support for critical legislation to raise the debt ceiling unless a commission to recommend cuts to Medicare and Social Security is approved. 1 Would these senators indeed let the United States default on its debt, or was their demand just a bluff?
on both of these issues; (2) bargainers are privately informed about their preferences; (3) communication takes place before a proposal is offered; (4) voting determines whether the proposal is implemented or not. By combining legislative bargaining with cheap talk our goal is to answer fundamental questions of political economy, "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell, 1958) , together with fundamental questions of communication theory, "who says what to whom in what channel with what effect" (Lasswell, 1948) .
Our results highlight the importance of ideological considerations for the rhetoric of the legislators to be informative, and their demands to influence the ultimate outcomes. To see this consider a legislature that operates under majority rule. Suppose all legislatures are aligned with respect to ideology so the only issue is how to divide the surplus. In such a purely distributive framework, any resources that the chair distributes to other legislators is a direct cost to himself. If he is unsure about which proposals the legislators are willing to accept, then he faces a trade-off in choosing his proposal: including more legislators in the winning coalition increases the chances that the proposal will pass, but decreases the payoff of the chair conditional on the acceptance of the proposal. We show that under plausible conditions the latter effect dominates, resulting in minimum winning coalitions. Now consider the trade-off the legislators face when they make their speeches and demands given that they expect some legislators to be left out of the winning coalition. Demanding a large share of the surplus may result in capturing a larger share of the surplus conditional on being included in the winning coalition, but it may also result in being excluded from the winning coalition altogether. If a legislator indeed has a high status quo payoff, then reporting his demands truthfully is likely to result in exclusion, i.e., he is likely to receive nothing. By pretending to have a low status quo payoff, he might be included in the winning coalition and thus can vote against the proposal, guaranteeing his status quo payoff. Consequently, there is no information transmission. 4 In light of these results, we proceed to analyze the case where both a policy dimension and a distributive dimension are present. We show that in equilibrium, the demands by the legislators have some influence on the bargaining outcome but they are not fully informative about the legislators' true preferences. We characterize the equilibria and show that equilibrium demands by the legislators can be either cooperative, compromising or tough. We provide an example that describes the equilibrium proposals in response to potential configurations of these demands. The basic model suggests more issues to explore, for example, the role of correlated types, interdependence of preferences, multiple rounds of communication and proposal making, private information on the part of the chair, public versus private communication, and sequential (possibly in an endogenous order) versus simultaneous communication. We discuss these in the last section.
Starting with the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining models have become a staple of political economy and have been used in numerous applications. The literature is too large to list comprehensively, the papers most closely related to our project are Baron (1991 Existing cheap talk literature has largely progressed in parallel to the bargaining literature. Exceptions are Farrell and Gibbons (1989) , Matthews (1989) , Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) . Of these Matthews (1989) is the most closely related to our project. He models presidential veto threats as cheap talk in a bilateral bargaining game over policy. Our framework differs from his setup by having multiple senders and also including a distributive dimension. Our project is also related to cheap talk games with multiple senders (see, for example, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) , Austen-Smith (1993), and Krishna and Morgan (2001), Battaglini (2002) , Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) ). Our framework differs from these papers because it has voting over the proposal made by the receiver and also incorporates a distributive dimension.
